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Abstract: 
The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has long been an advocate of greater 
transparency. One of the tools promoted to achieve more transparency is to describe the 
underlying uncertainties within EFSA’s scientific opinions.  The key issue though is 
whether members of the European public actually want to know more about the details of 
the scientific uncertainties associated with a certain risk topic or a scientific opinion or 
would they prefer to know less about these uncertainties? In this short research note we 
attempt to address this question. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has long been an advocate of greater 
transparency (Way and Lofstedt 2015; EFSA 2014).  One of the tools promoted to help 
achieve more transparency is to describe the underlying uncertainties within EFSA’s 
scientific opinions (EFSA 2005; 2015; 2016; Van Asselt et al 2009).  In the summer of 
2015, the Agency put forward its Guidance on Uncertainty in EFSA Scientific Assessment  
document for public commentary which was subsequently updated in February 2016 (EFSA 
2015; 2016; for a more thorough discussion, see Lofstedt and Bouder 2017 this issue).  
EFSA takes the view that being more transparent about uncertainties in their scientific 
opinions will: 
“enable citizens to contribute more widely to [EFSA’s] risk assessment work and 
thereby increase trust.” (EFSA 2015c, p.11) 
But do members of the European public actually want to know more about the details of the 
scientific uncertainties associated with a certain risk topic or a scientific opinion or would 
they prefer to know less about these scientific uncertainties?  In this short research note, we 
attempt to address this question.  We hope that our findings, along with EFSA’s own on-
going work on testing messages and establishing best practice with regards to uncertainty 
(EFSA 2016c), will assist the Agency in the on-going pursuit to maintain and strengthen its 
risk communication activities. 
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2. Literature review 
There are a number of academic articles discussing how members of the public view 
uncertainty and the findings are mixed at best (for a review, see Lofstedt and Bouder 2017 
this issue).  While Frewer et al.2002 note that individuals can accept uncertainty as part of 
the risk management process and prefer that to government inaction Fischhoff (2012) notes 
that individuals can interpret and understand explicit quantitative measures of uncertainty.    
 
Johnson and Slovic had mixed results, identifying in their research that whilst the majority 
of individuals would welcome uncertainty, some would not and would prefer being told 
whether something is safe or not.  They also show that by discussing uncertainty estimates 
this led some respondents to question the competency of the government agency in question 
(see Johnson 2003; Johnson and Slovic 1994a and b; 1995, 1996, 1998 [but see erratum 
Johnson 2004]).  As Johnson and Slovic conclude in one of their papers: 
“Uncertainty is a fact of life, but life goes on: similarly, citizens expect government 
action on pollution in spite of uncertainty, and may suspect the topic of uncertainty is 
being raised merely to justify inaction.” (Johnson and Slovic 1998, p.277) 
 
 
Inspired by this research and with the renewed policy interest in communicating uncertainty 
to the public by EFSA, this research note replicates some of the key questions explored by 
Johnson and Slovic some 20 years ago in an European context.  
 
3. Methodology  
 
We developed the study in the following way. Firstly, we pretested the 1998 Johnson and 
Slovic survey instrument on an undergraduate school class of 40 individuals at King’s 
College, London in the summer of 2016. Following this initial pretest, we amended the 
questionnaire slightly before sending it on to a couple of experts on uncertainty analysis 
who suggested a few more minor changes1. 
 
The final questionnaire comprised four parts2:  
(i) general responses to environmental health uncertainty and range bounds;  
(ii)  two scenarios (A and B), both focusing on a government announcement about a 
chemical in the person’s drinking water (whether tap or bottled water) with 
scenario A providing less uncertain information, and scenario B providing more 
uncertain information; 
(iii) views of government risk assessment; and  
(iv) sociodemographic information.  Most statements had a three-step, disagree-agree 
response format, with a ‘don’t know’ option.  Scenario A was provided to half of 
the sample, with scenario B provided to the other half. 
 
The Johnson and Slovic study was conducted on 280 respondents in November 1995 who 
answered an advertisement in the University of Oregon newspaper.  Our study differed in 
several ways.  Firstly, our study was conducted in more than one geographical location in 
Europe.  Rather than limiting the experimental study to one location (i.e. Eugene, Oregon) 
                                                 
1 These changes included building in an increased emphasis on the issues of public trust in government authorities and experts, 
and transparency; and defining an expert (‘scientist’) for the purposes of this questionnaire. 
2 See Section 4. Results for specific questions. 
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we wanted to get a greater geographical spread so that we could examine possible national 
variations and hence cultural differences.  Thus the research was conducted over the 
August-September 2016 time period in three different European countries (n=100 in each 
country), namely: 
a) Dublin and Waterford in Ireland; 
b)  Leewarden in Netherlands; 
c) Lille and Paris in France.  
Secondly, we decided to do face-to-face interviews, selecting participants via convenience 
sampling in the five urbanized areas across the three countries. This contrasts with the 
Johnson-Slovic study where respondents were asked to fill in a written questionnaire.  Face-
to-face interviews were chosen in order to ensure greater control over the comprehension of 
the questions so that participants provided an accurate representation of their attitudes 
towards uncertainty. The interviews were carried out by 3 PhD students who were fluent in 
English, Dutch and French respectively.  In each of the non-English speaking countries the 
questionnaire was translated from English into the relevant native language.  The data 
collection process itself was supervised by the second author, Maeve McLoughlin.  
Response rates varied between the three countries.  We achieved 33% in Ireland, 25% in the 
Netherlands and 50% in France.  Collectively, the group was 43 percent male, with the 
largest age group being 18-34 years.  60 percent were employed and 46 percent had 
children.  The sample was ‘over educated’ with some 64 percent either having an 
undergraduate or graduate degree, compared to the OECD average of 35 percent, and the 
country specific measure of 43 percent - Ireland, 35 percent – the Netherlands and 31 
percent – France (OECD, 2016, 2014).  See Table 1 which outlines all the socio-
demographic characteristics of the sample. 
 
Table 1.  Table outlining the socio-demographic characteristics of the sample. 
 
 Ireland Netherlands France 
Female (%)  55 54 63 
Age (Years)     
 18-34 19 27 84 
 35-49 46 21 11 
 50-64 13 38 5 
 65+ 22 14 0 
Support 
environmental 
groups (%) 
 77 39 31 
Support 
industry groups 
(%) 
 61 2 7 
Employed (% 
Yes) 
 67 58 54 
Children (% 
Yes) 
 59 52 26 
Education (%)     
 High school 
diploma & below 
16 14 7 
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 Vocational college 18 36 16 
 Undergrad 40 43 34 
 Postgrad & above 26 7 43 
 
 
4. Results  
 
Given a straightforward choice, the majority of the respondents preferred to know if a 
food/chemical was safe or not, rather than hearing risk estimates and ranges (see Tables 2-
5).  In these situations, they simply desired certainty.  What is especially interesting is that 
our respondents were more opposed to uncertainty than those in Johnson and Slovic’s 1998 
study, by 24, 20, 23 and 31 percentage points respectively, which is rather considerable (see 
Table 1, Questions 1(c), 1(d), 1(e) and 1(f), p265, Johnson and Slovic, 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Table showing responses to Question 3: When a chemical [contaminant] is found 
in my food/medicine, I don’t want to hear statistics, I just want to know if my 
food/medicine is safe. 
 
 Ireland (%) Netherlands (%) France (%) Total European countries 
(%) 
Agree  75 76 67 73 
Disagree 21 22 32 25 
Don’t know  4 2 1 2 
 
 
Table 3.  Table showing responses to Question 4: I am more comfortable with an expert’s 
(i.e. scientist’s) opinion about whether or not my food/water/medicine is safe than with a 
range of risk numbers from which I must draw my own conclusions. 
 
 Ireland (%) Netherlands (%) France (%) Total European countries 
(%) 
Agree  81 63 74 73 
Disagree 12 33 19 21 
Don’t know  7 4 7 43 
 
 
Table 4.  Table showing responses to Question 5: I would prefer that the government tell 
me that they’re just not sure about the size of a health/food risk, if that is the case, rather 
than give me a range of risk numbers. 
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 Ireland (%) Netherlands (%) France (%) Total European countries 
(%) 
Agree  60 74 66 67 
Disagree 35 22 26 28 
Don’t know  5 4 8 5 
 
 
Table 5.  Table showing responses to Question 6: I’d prefer a single, concrete risk number 
rather than a range of numbers for the food/public health risks that I face. 
 
 Ireland (%) Netherlands (%) France (%) Total European countries 
(%) 
Agree  62 62 62 62 
Disagree 27 30 14 24 
Don’t know  11 14 24 14 
 
 
Respondents preferences changed, however, when it came down to a choice between 
hearing uncertain risk information or facing a lack of transparency from the government.  In 
this situation, people preferred transparency about uncertainty (see Table 6).  This finding 
aligns with the conclusions from a number of studies of Europe’s ‘post-trust’ era (see 
Lofstedt et al., 2011; Lofstedt, 2005).  In order for people to trust these authorities it 
appears, at least from these studies, that the public requires an increased level of 
transparency of decision-making processes from regulators and policy-makers.  
Interestingly, these results again differ from Johnson and Slovic’s 1998 study, where the 
significant majority (74 percent) of their sample preferred not to be informed by the 
government about an uncertain environmental or public health condition, compared to 31 
percent of our sample.   
 
This preference for increased levels of transparency from government authorities is also 
seen if one compares responses with the equivalent risk communication from expert 
scientists (see Tables 7 and 8), signifying that people trust experts more than they do 
government officials.  
 
 
Table 6.  Table showing responses to Question 2: If the government is having difficulty in 
determining how much of a risk an environmental or public health condition poses to me, I 
prefer the government not to inform me about this. 
 
 Ireland (%) Netherlands (%) France (%) Total European countries 
(%) 
Agree  29 45 19 31 
Disagree 63 54 75 64 
Don’t know  8 2 6 5 
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Table 7.  Table showing responses to Question 1(a): I prefer being told that a situation is 
safe or unsafe by expert scientists, rather than hearing risk numbers, such as a ‘health risk 
of getting cancer is 1 in 1 million’. 
 
 Ireland (%) Netherlands (%) France (%) Total European countries 
(%) 
Agree  76 59 72 69 
Disagree 17 30 18 22 
Don’t know  7 11 10 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.  Table showing responses to Question 1(b): I prefer being told that a situation is 
safe or unsafe by the government, rather than hearing risk numbers, such as a ‘health risk of 
getting cancer is 1 in 1 million’.   
 
 Ireland (%) Netherlands (%) France (%) Total European countries  
(%) 
Agree  29 45 32 35 
Disagree 63 49 53 55 
Don’t know  8 6 15 10 
 
 
Inferential statistics were used to analyse the data set, considering the socio-demographic 
characteristics (age, employment status, whether people had children, level of education 
attained, sex, environment group affiliation and industry group affiliation) collected in Part 
iv of the questionnaire (see Table 9), and preference for uncertainty/certainty when given a 
straightforward choice. 
 
Table 9.  Table showing the background questions and required responses that were 
included in Part iv of the questionnaire  
 
Part iv. Background questions 
 
Q.22 What year were you born? 
Q.23 Do you support environmental groups such as Greenpeace? (Yes/No) 
Q.24 Do you support industry organisations such as [Ireland specific: IBEC, Irish 
Business & Employers Confederation] (Yes/No) 
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Q.25 Are you presently employed? (Yes/No) 
Q.26 Do you have children? (Yes/No) 
Q.27 How much education have you had? (Choose a, b, c, d or e) 
a. Some high school/gymnasium 
b. High school diploma 
c. Some college 
d. Undergraduate degree 
e. Postgraduate studies 
Q.28 Gender? (Male/Female) 
 
The results indicated little variation between a number of socio-demographic 
characteristics, including employment status, sex, environmental and industry group 
affiliation, and the preference for uncertainty/certainty. 
 
The following socio-demographic characteristics did show variation as described below. 
 
Age 
 
Cross-tabulation analysis of Part i of the questionnaire indicated that respondents over 65 
years wanted fewer details of uncertainty than any other age band.  The results also 
indicated that respondents aged 18-35 years (the youngest age band) wanted more details 
about uncertainty than any other age band, except when the information was being provided 
by experts. 
 
Children 
 
Cross-tabulation analysis of Question 1 of Part i indicated that respondents with children 
wanted more details on uncertainty than those without children.  However, the statistical 
analysis for Question 3: ‘When a chemical is found in my food/medicine, I don’t want to 
hear statistics, I just want to know if my food/medicine is safe’, indicated that respondents 
with children didn’t want to hear statistics.  They simply wanted to know if the food was 
safe. 
 
Education 
 
The results were mixed in relation to education bands and preferences, however cross-
tabulation analysis of Question 2, 4 and 6 of Part i of the questionnaire indicated that the 
least education group (obtained high school diploma and below) were less likely to want 
details of uncertainty than any other group.  This aligns with Johnson and Slovic’s 1998 
study where they found that ‘support for receiving a range of risk estimates seemed to have 
been enhanced by a college-derived familiarity with the concept that uncertainty is common 
on good science.   To the extent that such support is knowledge-based, [Johnson and Slovic] 
would not expect it to be more common among populations with average education…[thus] 
less-educated audiences would be less familiar with, and less accepting of, uncertainties 
(holding other potential factors such as trust in authorities, constant).’  Simply put, they 
expect that a sample with an average education would have less preference for uncertainty, 
and a sample with an over-average education would have more preference, except in 
situations where trust in the authority is a factor.  
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Responses to range bounds 
 
A further finding relates to the responses to range bounds.  To do this, we asked about 
agreement with the statement ‘If a range of food/public health risk numbers are given 
(ranging from 60 percent to 40 percent), I would believe that the highest risk number is the 
correct one’, and we took agreement with this statement as a valid measure of ‘upward bias’ 
in line with Johnson and Slovic’s 1998 study.  Overall, we found that half (41 percent) of 
our respondents would not believe the highest risk number if a range was provided (akin to 
a type of positivity bias for the upper bound), although this was a slim majority, with nearly 
as many (36 percent) believing it (akin to a type of negativity bias for the lower bound) (23 
percent did not know) (see Table 10).  This was in contrast to the Johnson and Slovic 1998 
study, and Viscusi et al’s 1991 study, both of which had a majority trend towards negativity 
bias.  At a country level, the findings were more definitive.  Ireland showed a strong trend 
towards a negativity bias, with over half (56 percent) believing the highest risk number if a 
range was provided, similar to the Johnson and Slovic 1998 study, and larger than the 
Viscusi et al 1991 study (22 percent).  In contrast, both the Netherlands and France showed 
trends towards a positivity bias (55 percent and 41 percent respectively), although it should 
be noted that a significant number of the French sample did not know (36 percent).   
 
Table 10.  Table showing responses to Question 7: If a range of food/public health risk 
numbers are given (ranging from 60 percent to 40 percent), I would believe that the highest 
risk number is the correct one. 
 
 Ireland (%) Netherlands (%) France (%) Total European countries 
(%) 
Agree  56 30 23 36 
Disagree 27 55 41 41 
Don’t know  17 15 36 23 
 
 
The current presentation of the findings is a preliminary review of the response set to the 
interview data that was collected, from which general conclusions can be drawn with regard 
to the insights on general attitudes towards uncertainty in the context of food safety. 
 
5. Discussion/analysis 
 
As described previously, our sample was young and ‘over-educated’ compared to the 
OECD and national averages.  Analysis of the preferences of these socio-demographic 
characteristics indicated that respondents aged 18-34 years (the youngest age band) and the 
largest age group, wanted more details about uncertainty than any other age band, except 
when the information was being provided by trusted experts, in which case they were happy 
to accept less detailed, certain information.  Our analysis also indicated that the least 
educated group were less likely to want details of uncertainty than any other group.  This 
led us to consider, in line with Johnson and Slovic’s 1998 expectations, that such support is 
knowledge-based.  Thus a sample with an over-average education (such as ours) appears to 
have the conceptual apparatus for handling more uncertainty.  Based on this analysis, and in 
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view of our ‘skewed’ sample, a high preference for uncertainty was expected, except in 
situations where trusted experts communicated the information, in which case, our sample 
would be content to receive less detailed, certain information. 
 
To some extent, our expectations were met.  In situations where the government was 
specified as the risk communicator, the majority of our sample preferred more detailed, 
uncertain information.  Put simply, they cared more about the basis on which the details of 
uncertainty were communicated.  This preference for increased levels of transparency from 
government authorities is considered directly related to low levels of public trust in  
government, as previously highlighted by Lofstedt et al (2011) and Lofstedt (2005), and to 
some extent affirms EFSA’s view.  However, in situations where people had a 
straightforward choice, the majority of people preferred certainty to uncertainty, both in 
relation to risk estimates and ranges, overriding the expected skew from our youthful, 
educated sample, in contrast to Johnson and Slovic’s expectations. 
 
In addition, we found an overall slim majority trending towards positivity bias (i.e. 
regarding the upper bounds of reporting risk: 60% over 40%), in further contrast to Johnson 
and Slovic’s 1998 study, as well as Viscusi et al’s 1991 study.  What is interesting is that of 
all the results, this finding had national variations.  The Netherlands and France continued 
to show a strong trend towards positivity bias.  However, Ireland showed a strong trend in 
the opposite direction (56 percent of the Irish sample believed that the highest risk number 
in a range was the correct one, compared to 27 percent who did not believe this (17 percent 
did not know)), confirming in this Irish case the findings from Johnson and Slovic, as well 
as Viscusi et al. (1991).   
 
These differences between European countries in terms of accepted preference for  high 
risks associated with public health/environmental risks have been previously identified by 
researchers examining effective policy communication in food safety (Lobb et al., 2006; 
Frewer at al, 1996).  For example, Lobb et al (2006) found that the French may have a 
higher level of trust in their food chain actors in line with their tendency to purchase food 
from higher quality sources, which may explain their positivity bias.  The negativity bias by 
Irish consumers towards food/health risks has been identified in a previous study by 
Kennedy et al. (2009).  In their study into public perceptions immediately after the dioxin in  
Irish pork crisis in December 2008, despite assurances from both the media and the food 
safety authorities that there was no risk to human health from contaminated pork, it was 
found to be the primary concern of most respondents in the study.  Kennedy et al. 2009 
found that this perception could not be explained by issues of trust.  Instead they explained 
it by dread, such as described by Slovic et al 1984., lack of knowledge and/or a lack of 
perceived control.  The researchers considered that the lack of consumer understanding and 
effects of the availability heuristic in relation to food risks had such important implications 
for food safety agencies in Ireland, that they recommended further work was merited in 
monitoring consumers’ perceptual shifts in relation to food safety over time.  During the 
time that the  Irish interviews were conducted (summer 2016), a number of respondents 
expressed concern in relation to lead in service connection water pipes, which has been 
recently identified as a human health risk to approximately 180,000 homes across Ireland, 
to be removed by the Irish Water agency over the course of the next decade (Kelly, 2016).  
Perhaps this recent and ongoing scare has affected Irish consumer bias towards such risks, 
in a similar manner via lack of understanding and/or the availability heuristic?        
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6. Policy implications of our findings     
 
Contrary to what EFSA has been noting in their uncertainty guidance documents (EFSA 
2015 and 2016), given a straightforward choice, the majority of the Europeans interviewed 
in this study appeared to want to know less about the details of scientific uncertainties 
associated with a certain risk topic or scientific opinion.  That said, trust is an essential 
requirement to accepting certainty.  Where public trust in an authority is low, more 
transparency about scientific uncertainties may help increase those levels of trust.   
 
Caution should be exercised when considering age, education, and other socio-demographic 
characteristics as indicators of an audience’s preference for certainty/uncertainty.  
Europeans are more likely to respond in culturally specific ways, and cultural differences, 
rather than socio-demographic characteristics, should be taken into account when 
developing risk communication strategies, suggesting a need for country-specific policy 
design, as recommended by Lobb et al (2006). 
 
We therefore take the view that EFSA should be careful in how they plan to roll out their 
uncertainty guidance going forward and perhaps avoid a one-size-fits-all policy regarding 
risk/uncertainty communication.  The minimum that EFSA could do is to test the final 
uncertainty messages derived from the scientific opinions on the European public to see if 
they are welcomed.   
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